

PAPER IV.—MILITARY OPERATIONS AT QUEBEC,
FROM THE CAPITULATION BY DE RAMEZAY,
ON THE 18TH SEPTEMBER, 1759, TO THE RAISING
OF THE SIEGE BY DE LEVIS, BETWEEN THE
NIGHT OF THE 17TH AND THE MORNING OF THE
18TH MAY, 1760.

BY DR. W. J. ANDERSON, PRESIDENT.

(Read before the Society April 6th, 1870.)

In this paper, I propose to bring under the notice of the Society General Murray's despatch to Mr. Secretary Pitt, dated May 25th, 1760, which has been casually referred to by Mr. LeMoine and other writers, but which, so far as I am aware, has been only published *in extenso* by Hawkins in his *Picture of Quebec*, which is now out of print, and very difficult of access; so much so, that I was not aware of the existence of the despatch, till a few weeks ago, when a copy from the Archives of Nova Scotia was forwarded to me from Halifax, through the kindness of Mr. T. B. Akins, Commissioner of Records.

In connexion with this despatch, I shall present copies of some other documents corroborative of it, together with such comments as appear to me to be naturally suggested by the various accounts which we have received of the same affairs.

Owing to the absence of the official despatches, and numerous discrepancies, we have hitherto been scarcely in a position to place implicit reliance on any of the narratives; but now the readers of Knox's journal will be pleased to find a general coincidence between his statements and those of the other writers I shall adduce, and Murray, whose truthfulness, candour, and accuracy of detail cannot be doubted, whatever we may think of his prudence in hazarding a pitched battle outside of the fortifications on the 28th April, 1760, with an enemy vastly superior in numbers.

The campaign of 1759 may be said to have closed with the capitulation of Quebec; and as the British generals had been successful in their advance on Lake Champlain, the capture of Fort Niagara, and the removal of the French from their post between Lake Erie and the Ohio, it appeared probable that unless the French were reinforced from Europe, their forces in Canada, estimated at 10,000 men, including 5,000 regulars, would, next campaign, have to surrender, and the country be yielded to Great Britain; but if a French armament should appear in the St. Lawrence before a British, there was a possibility that Quebec might be recaptured,—at any rate, it was probable that the conquest might be postponed for some time, if not altogether averted. To understand the actual position, we require to take into account not only the numbers, but the character and condition of the forces on both sides, as well as the state of the garrisons, and the feeling and aspirations of the Canadians.

First, in reference to the French troops:—There can be no doubt that the regulars were veterans who had seen much service, and that they were officered by men of distinguished ability. As to the militia, though in certain quarters it has been attempted to throw discredit on them (based on alleged expressions of Montcalm in the bitterness of death), we must agree with Mr. LeMoine, that on almost all occasions they proved themselves efficient and reliable, as we would expect men to be who were undoubtedly animated by the strongest feelings of attachment to their native land, their homes and altars, and by a corresponding aversion to the English, whom they very naturally looked upon as ruthless invaders. It is true that Wolfe wrote to Lord Holderness, on Sept. 9th, 1759, that the force under Montcalm was “A numerous body of armed men, for I cannot call it an army. If the Marquis had shut himself up in the town of Quebec, it would have long since been in our possession, because the defences are inconsiderable and our artillery formidable.” Yet we ought

to recollect that this body of armed men was similar in character to the 3,600 who, two years before, on the 8th July, 1758, under the same commander, at Carillon (Ticonderoga), had struggled successfully for six hours, and disastrously repulsed a British army under Abercromby, composed of 6,300 Regulars and 9,000 Provincials,—inflicting a great defeat but no disgrace on adversaries who proved their valor by the persistency of their attacks, or, in the language of Garneau, by their “unexampled efforts,” and by an admitted loss of 1907 men—a loss sufficiently great, one would think, but which Garneau says contemporary accounts estimated at from *four to five thousand men*, while the French lost only 377. When we recollect also the severe repulse which the British met with at Beauport Flats, on the 31st July, 1759, we are inclined to attach great weight to what Montcalm wrote from Carillon :—“Oh ! such troops as ours, my dear Doreil ; I never saw their match !”—and are justified in thinking that the troops in Canada after the capitulation of Quebec were by no means to be despised.

Now, as to the *fortress* of Quebec, we can infer what Wolfe’s opinion was, from the expression of the letter just quoted ; what Montcalm thought of it we are equally competent to judge from his exclamation, when he was informed Wolfe’s army was on the Plains of Abraham : “They have at last got to the weak side of this wretched garrison.” The wretched garrison had been made more wretched by the bombardment which had destroyed the eastern part of the Lower Town, amounting to 535 houses.

Thirdly, as to the population :—When Wolfe entered the St. Lawrence, he issued a proclamation, stating that he had not come to make war on the *habitants*, whom he recommended to remain at their occupations, promising them protection and the free exercise of their religion ; yet, so hostile was their feeling, that he found (as the French subsequently did in Spain) an enemy behind every tree and bank. This, as we have already stated, was, perhaps, quite natural, and is

entitled to our respect; and it was still more to be expected, that, after the devastations which had been *compulsorily* perpetrated by the British on the rural districts before the capitulation, the feelings of the *habitants* should be still more exacerbated, and, unless under the guns of the fortress, that they should be actively hostile and aiding Levis by supplies which were withheld from the British.

This, then, was the state of things in October, when Murray was left in command: there was a wretched fortress, a hostile population, an enemy numbering 10,000 combatants, under an able and energetic commander, who now also held command of the river, and was, moreover, encouraged by the active sympathies of a friendly population; Murray, on the other hand, though he was left 7000 men, sustained by the prestige of victory, knew from the feeling of the population that he had no control over the country beyond his entrenchments, and that he had to encounter a severity of climate to which his soldiers were unaccustomed, and for which, as subsequent events proved, they were very ill-prepared.

On referring to the despatches written at the time, we find Admiral Saunders wrote to Governor Whitmore, at Cape Breton:—"I have the satisfaction of informing you that we have been in possession of Quebec ever since the 18th instant; and as it is found *practicable to keep possession of it*, I believe you will not receive any troops from hence."

And Sir Jeffery Amherst wrote to Gov. Pownall on the 15th Nov.:—"I have this moment received a letter from Brigadier-General Moncton, bearing date at Quebec, the 25th Sept. last, acquainting me that from the strength of the army under his command, he don't think there is a man more than ought to stay at the place." He also wrote that there was still some clothing at New York belonging to the regiment at Quebec.

On the 4th March, 1760, Amherst again wrote to Governor Lawrence, saying that he had received intelligence from Quebec, under date 26th Jany., that the French fleet of sixteen vessels came down the river and anchored in sight of the town; that seven had passed the garrison in the night, five were cast away, and the rest had returned back up the river. That Captain Miller, of the *Sea-horse*, with a lieutenant and forty-four seamen, had gone on board one of the abandoned vessels, and that all were blown up, only two being saved. That four frigates were wintering up the river, and some in Gaspé. He adds:—"This intelligence was brought by Lieut. Montresor, who, with an officer and ten rangers, left Quebec on 26th Jany., came by the Chaudière and Amerascaegen rivers, and got to Boston in thirty-one days; he adds, when he left Quebec, all was well there, that they had plenty of fresh provisions, and that there was still a great deal left when he came away; and that Brigadier Murray had taken post at St. Foy and Lorette, whereby his wood-cutters were perfectly secure, as were also his garrison, from a line of block-houses he had caused to be erected on the outside of his works; in short, that he was in a perfect state of defence, and prepared against everything the enemy might attempt; indeed, nothing can be more unlikely than the enemy attempting anything there; but the repairs have made it a formidable place for such a numerous garrison, and with the chain of block-houses, Quebec is now much more respectable than ever it was. He also adds that six thousand Canadians had taken the oaths and brought in their arms, and they seemed much pleased with their change of masters; that he employed several of them, whom he paid, and that they did their business cheerfully and well."

Amherst also wrote that he had despatched an express to Lord Colville, requesting him to take the earliest opportunity of preventing any succours from getting up to the enemy, but also intercepting the frigates and vessels that had wintered in the St. Lawrence and Gaspé, and thereby prevent M. Vaudreuil having any communication with France.

Mr. LeMoine, in his preliminary remarks to the account of the battle of St. Foy, in his *Maple Leaves*, says: "There are so many accounts of the St. Foy battle that it seems superfluous to dwell at length on the subject. We have the story of eye-witnesses, such as Mante, Knox, Fraser; also of Chevalier Johnston, a Scotchman, fighting in Canada for the cause of France. We also have Smith's account, not over correct, and Garneau's narrative, probably the most complete, and collated from documents, many of which had never seen the light before. He computes the English force at 7,714, exclusive of officers. The French force were more numerous; there were among them, 3,000 Montreal and Three Rivers militia, and 400 savages; the Quebec district having been compelled by General Murray to swear allegiance to the English monarch."

Garneau is considered by the English to write from a French-Canadian point of view, as strongly as Smith is supposed by the French Canadians to write from the opposite. We may get some light on the subject, not by referring to other English writers, who from their unanimity may be thought to be all animated with a feeling which obscured their correct vision, but from another Canadian historian, the Abbé Ferland, who writes, page 596:—"The English lost 500 men, and the French 700, including many officers. We had not more than 4,500 in the battle. The victory is due to the valor of the troops and of the Canadians, and the conduct of the officers." In a foot note the Abbé says this is from *Levis'* letter, still extant in Paris. He further says, Murray marched out with 4000 men. Here is at once a difference of 3,714 (nearly one-half) between Garneau and Ferland. We will state why a preference should be given to Ferland. According to English official statements, and also according to Fraser, there were in Wolfe's expedition to Quebec 8,600 men, including 1,000 marines, 300 artillery, and 400 rangers. It can be established that from the time of the arrival to the battle of the 13th Sept., Wolfe's army had *not under* 1,000 put *hors de combat*. Garneau

says, at the battle of Beauport Flats alone, their loss was 500 killed and wounded, that of the French being inconsiderable. The British admit a loss of 61 killed and 600 wounded in the battle of the 13th September: it may, therefore, without any great stretch of belief, be admitted that the British force left with Murray did not exceed 7,000 men; Mante makes it 7,300; Lord Mahon, "above 6,000 men."

But it is better for us to stop here, and let Murray himself recite how it came to pass that an army which had been left with him in October, 1759, in good health, and confident in their numbers and late success, and which continued to be in fine condition down to the 26th Jany. following, was so reduced by the 28th April, that he was able to march out of Quebec, and take his position at the St. Foy Road, not with 4000 men, as stated by Ferland, but with 3000, as we will by and by see, the whole force then available; and we will see whether, as Lord Mahon alleges, "it seems contrary to common sense to choose to try the fortune of war in the open field, instead of reserving the troops for the defence of a fortified post," and that his conduct originated from being "flushed with victory, and emulous of the fame of Wolfe."

I shall now read Murray's letter:

"General Murray to Mr. Secretary Pitt.

QUEBEC, May 25th, 1760.

"Sir,—Having acquainted General Amherst, three weeks ago, that Quebec was besieged by an army of 15,000 men, I think it necessary to do myself the honor of addressing directly to you the more agreeable news of the siege being raised, lest, by your receiving the former intelligence before the latter, some inconvenience might arise to His Majesty's service.

"By the journal of my proceedings since I have had the command here, which I have the honor to transmit to you, you will perceive the superiority we have maintained over the enemy during the winter, and that all Lower Canada, from the *Pointe-aux-Trembles*, was reduced, and had taken the oath of fidelity to the King. You will, no doubt, be pleased to observe, that the enemy's attempts upon our posts, and ours upon theirs, all tended to the honor of His Majesty's arms, as they were always baffled, and we were constantly lucky: I wish

I could say as much within the walls ; the excessive coldness of the climate, and constant living upon salt provisions, without any vegetables, introduced the scurvy among the troops, which, getting the better of every precaution of the officer, and every remedy of the surgeon, became as universal as it was inveterate ; in so much, that before the end of April 1,000 were dead, and above 2,000 of what remained totally unfit for any service.

“ In this situation, I received certain intelligence that the Chevalier de Lévis was assembling his army, which had been cantoned in the neighbourhood of Montreal ; that he had completed his eight battalions and 40 companies of the *troupes de colonie* from the choice of the Montrealists ; had formed these 40 companies into four battalions ; and was determined to besiege us the moment the St. Lawrence was open, of which he was entirely master, by means of four King's frigates and other craft proper for this extraordinary river.

“ As I had the honor to acquaint you formerly that Quebec could be looked upon in no other light than that of a strong cantonment, and that any works I should add to it would be in that style, my plan of defence was, to take the earliest opportunity of entrenching myself upon the heights of Abraham, which entirely command the ramparts of the place at the distance of 800 yards, and might have been defended by our numbers against a large army. But the Chevalier de Lévis did not give me time to take the advantage of this situation. The 23rd, 24th, and 25th of April, I attempted to execute the projected lines, for which a provision of fascines, and of every necessary material, had been made ; but found it impracticable, as the earth was still covered with snow in many places, and everywhere impregnably bound up by frost.

“ The night of the 26th, I was informed the enemy had landed at Pointe-aux-Trembles 10,000 men and 500 barbarians. The post we had taken at the embouchure of the river Cap Rouge, (the most convenient place for disembarking their artillery and stores, and for securing their retreat,) obliged them to land where they did, 20 miles higher up.

“ The 27th, having broke down all the bridges over the Cap Rouge, and secured the landing-places at Sillery and the Foulon, I marched with the grenadiers, piquets, Amherst's regiment, and two field-pieces, and took post so advantageously as to frustrate the scheme they had laid, of cutting-off our posts.

“ They had begun to form from the defile they were obliged to pass, but thought proper to retreat on reconnoitering our position ; and about four this afternoon, we marched back to town, having withdrawn all our posts, with the loss of two men only, though they did everything in their power to harass the rear.

“ The enemy was greatly superior in number, it is true ; but, when I considered that our little army was in the habit of beating that enemy, and had a very fine train of field artillery ; that shutting ourselves up at once within the walls was putting all upon the single chance of holding out for a

considerable time a wretched fortification, (a chance which an action in the field could hardly alter, at the same time that it gave an additional one, perhaps a better,) I resolved to give them battle; and if the event was not prosperous, to hold out to the last extremity, and then to retreat to the isle of Orleans or Coudres with what was left of the garrison, to wait for reinforcements.

"This night, the necessary orders were given; and half-an-hour after six next morning, we marched with all the force I could muster, viz., 3,000 men, and formed the army on the heights in the following order:—Amherst's, Anstruther's, 2nd battalion of Royal Americans, and Webb's, composed the right brigade, commanded by Col. Burton; Kennedy's, Lascelles's, the Highlanders, and Towshend's, the left brigade, commanded by Col. Fraser; Otway's and the third battalion of Royal Americans were the *corps de réserve*. Major Dalling's corps of light infantry covered the right flank; and Captain Hazzeu's company of Rangers, with 100 volunteers, under the command of Captain Donald Macdonald, a brave and experienced officer, covered the left. The battalions had two field-pieces.

"While the line was forming, I reconnoitred the enemy, and perceived their van had taken possession of the rising ground, three-quarters of a mile in our front, but that their army was upon the march, in one column, as far as I could see. I thought this the lucky moment, and moved with the utmost order to attack them before they had formed. We soon beat them from the heights they had possessed, though they were well disputed; and Major Dalling, who cannot be too much commended for his behaviour this day, and for his services during the winter, forced their corps of grenadiers from a house and wind-mill they had taken hold of to cover their left flank. Here, he and several of his officers were wounded. His men, however, pursued the fugitives to the corps which were now formed to sustain them; they halted and dispersed along the front of the right, which prevented that wing from taking advantage of the first impression they had made on the enemy's left. They had, immediately, orders given them to regain the flank; but in attempting this, they were charged, thrown into disorder, retired to the rear, and from the number of officers killed and wounded, could never again be brought up during this action. Otway's was instantly ordered to advance and sustain the right wing, which the enemy in vain made two attempts to penetrate. On these occasions, Captain Iace, with the grenadiers of Otway's, were distinguished. While this passed there, the left was not idle: they had dispossessed the enemy of two redoubts, and sustained with unparalleled firmness the bold united efforts of the enemy's regulars, Indians and Canadians; till at last, fairly fought down, and reduced to a handful, though sustained by the third battalion of Royal Americans from the reserve, and Kennedy's from the centre, where we had nothing to fear, they were obliged to yield to superior numbers and a fresh column of Roussillon, which penetrated.

"The disorder of the left was soon communicated to the right; but the whole retired in such a way that the enemy did not venture upon a brisk

pursuit. We left most of our cannon, as the roughness of the ground and the wreaths of snow made it impossible to bring them off; what could not be brought off were nailed up.

"Our killed and wounded amounted to one-third of those in the field; that of the enemy, by their own confession, exceeds 2500 men, which may be readily conceived, as the action lasted an hour and three-quarters.

"Here I think it my duty to express my gratitude to the officers in general, and the satisfaction I had in the bravery of all the troops.

"On the night of the 28th, the enemy opened trenches against the town, and at the same time we set to work within to fortify it, which we never had in our power to attempt sooner, for the severity of this climate during the winter, and the absolute necessity of executing work of more immediate importance last autumn, before the frost set in. I wanted the assistance of Major Mackellar, the chief engineer, dangerously wounded in the action; his zeal for and knowledge in the service is well known; but the alacrity of the garrison made up for every defect.

"My journal of the siege, which accompanies this, sets forth in full what was done; and I flatter myself the extraordinary performances of the handful of brave men I had left, will please His Majesty as much as they surprised us, who were eye-witnesses of them.

"Great praise is due to Commodore Swanton, and the Captains Schomberg and Deane: I have not words to express the readiness, vivacity, and valor they shewed in attacking and destroying the enemy's squadron. Capt. Deane has lost his ship; but it was in a good cause, and he had done honour to his country.

"The morning of the 17th May, I had intended a strong sortie, to have penetrated into the enemy's camp, which, from the information of the prisoners I had taken, and the concurrent accounts of deserters, I conceived to be very practicable.

"For this purpose I had ordered the regiments of Amherst, Townshend, Lascelles, Anstruther, and Highlanders, with the Grenadiers and light infantry under arms, but was informed by Lieutenant M'Alpin, of my battalion, (whom I sent out to amuse the enemy with small sallies,) that their trenches were abandoned.

"I instantly pushed out, at the head of these corps, not doubting but we must have overtaken and forced their rear, and had ample revenge for the 28th of April; but I was disappointed, for they had crossed the river Cap Rouge before we could come up with them. However, we took several prisoners and much baggage, which would otherwise have escaped. They left their camp standing; all their baggage, stores, magazines of provisions and ammunition; 34 pieces of battering cannon, four of which are brass 12-pounders; ten field-pieces; six mortars; four petards; a large quantity of scaling-ladders, and

entrenching tools beyond number; and have retired to their former asylum, Jacques Cartier. From the information of prisoners, deserters, and spies, provisions are very scarce; ammunition does not abound, and the greatest part of the Canadians have deserted them. At present, they do not exceed above five thousand men. The minute I am joined with that part of my garrison which was sent from hence last autumn, I shall endeavour to co-operate with Mr. Amherst towards completing the reduction of the country; though, if rightly informed, he can hardly act by the lakes before the month of July; of which I am the more convinced, because, from the intelligence forwarded to him last February, of the enemy's designs, by Lieutenant Montrosor, he would certainly have been upon them before now, had it been at all practicable.

"Major Maitland, the bearer of these despatches, who has acted as adjutant-general this last winter, is well acquainted with all our transactions here; he has a thorough knowledge of the country, and can give you the best lights with regard to the measures further to be taken relative to His Majesty's views in Canada.

"I cannot finish this long letter without observing how much I think myself obliged to the Lieutenant-Governor, Col. Burton: his activity and zeal were conspicuous during the whole course of this severe winter campaign; and I flatter myself, sir, you will be pleased to lay his services before His Majesty.

"P. S.—Since I have wrote the above, a nation of Indians has surrendered, and entered into an alliance with us.

"I have the honour to be, with great regard, Sir, yours, &c., .

"JAS. MURRAY."

I shall next invite your attention to the other documents referred to in my introduction. The first of these, which appeared in the *London Magazine* in 1760, furnishes details of the proceedings of Commodore Swanton and Captains Schomberg and Deane, to which General Murray so thankfully refers in the despatch which has just been read. It is as follows:

"ADMIRALTY OFFICE, June 27, 1760.

"Captain Schomberg arrived this morning, with despatches from Lord Colville and Commodore Swanton, dated at Quebec, the 24th of May, giving an account that on the 11th of that month, the latter arrived at the isle of Bic, in the river of St. Lawrence, with the *Vanguard* and *Diana*, where he intended to wait for such of his squadron as had separated from him in his passage from England; but having on the 14th received advice from Brigadier-General Murray that the enemy had besieged Quebec, he got under sail with the utmost despatch, and anchored above Point Levi on the 15th, in the evening, where he found

the *Lowestoffe*, one of his squadron, which arrived a few days before, and whose commander, Captain Deane, immediately came off to him with a message from the general, earnestly recommending the speedy removal of the French naval force above the town, consisting of two frigates, two armed ships, and many smaller vessels ; in consequence of which, he ordered Captain Schomberg, of the *Diana*, and Captain Deane, of the *Lowestoffe*, to slip their cables early the next morning, and attack the enemy ; but they were no sooner in motion than the enemy fled in the greatest hurry and disorder. The *Pomona*, one of the frigates, was driven on shore above Cape Diamond ; the *Atlanta*, the other frigate, run ashore, and was burnt at Pointe-aux-Trembles, about ten leagues above the town ; and most of the other ships and vessels were likewise driven ashore or effectually destroyed.

“ The night following, the enemy raised the siege of Quebec very precipitately, leaving their cannon, small arms, stores, &c., behind them.

“ The *Lowestoffe* ran upon some unknown rocks, in pursuit of the enemy, and was irrecoverably lost ; but the officers and men were saved.

“ Lord Colville sailed from Halifax, with the squadron under his command, on the 22nd of April, but did not arrive at Quebec till the 18th of May, having been much retarded in his passage by thick fogs, great quantities of ice, and contrary winds.”—(*From London Magazine for 1760.*)

I give, next, the statement contained in the *Gentleman's Magazine*, 1760, vol. 30, which appears headed—

“ *The French Account of the Transactions of their Army in Canada, under the command of the Chevalier de Levis, from the 18th April to the 18th May, 1760.*

“ On the 17th of April, we left *Montreal*, under the command of *M. Levis*, with the following battalions of regulars, *Canadians*, and *Indians* :

	<i>Men.</i>
One battalion of the Queen's regiment.....	500
One ditto regiment of Bayard.....	500
One ditto Guienne.....	500
One ditto Languedoc.....	500
One ditto Laffarre.....	500
One ditto Roussillon.....	500
Two ditto Berry.....	1000
Two ditto Marines.....	1000

“ In all, ten battalions ; but as they were defective, the whole is supposed to have amounted to 4,500 regulars, besides 6,000 *Canadians*, of which 200 were mounted, and formed a body of horse ; 250 *Indians*, of the *Iroquois* and other nations. Our provisions, ammunition, and heaviest baggage, were carried down in six frigates, from 44 to 26 guns, who had under their convoy a great number of schooners, bateaux, and other small craft for the army. We had nine

days' march from *Montreal* to *Cap Rouge*, and on the tenth day arrived on the Plains of *Abraham*, three miles from *Quebec*. Eleven companies of grenadiers advanced, while the rest of the army were posted in the houses on each side of the road leading from *Cap Rouge* to *Quebec*; at about half a league's distance, we met an advanced party of the *English*, with whom we had three or four different skirmishes, in their retreat to the town. The 28th, about nine in the morning, we perceived the body of the *English* garrison in motion, beating the *generale*; at ten, were formed the regiments of *Roussillon* and *Laffarre* in the centre; the regiments of *Guienne*, *Bayard's*, and *Queen's* on the right; and the regiments of *Languedoc*, *Berry*, and the grenadiers, on the left. We formed a line three deep, and in the intervals of the regulars were posted the *Canadians*. The battalions of *Marines*, with the *Indians*, were advantageously posted in the entrance of a wood. The *English* advanced with great resolution, with their field-pieces in front, and their first impression was such as obliged our centre to give way; but we soon recovered our disorder, and continued returning the compliment of their fire. Our wings at the same time advanced, and formed a semi-circle upon the enemy's flanks; whereupon they thought proper to return into the town, leaving us the field, their artillery, and above 2000 entrenching tools. In this action, *M. Bon la Mare* commanded on the right, *M. Dumas* in the centre, and *M. Levis* on the left. We opened ground that evening, and continued working till the 7th of *May*, when we began to batter the walls with twelve iron pieces of 12-pounders, which continued till the arrival of the *Vanguard*, which *M. Levis* imagining to be only the foremost of a large reinforcement, raised the siege, after nailing some of his battering cannon, and leaving the heaviest of his baggage behind, the artillery taken from the *English* having been sent up the river in one of the ships. I compute, in the action of the 28th of April, our loss to be about 1800 killed and wounded. When we left *Montreal*, it was in a weak state of defence, not above ten pieces of indifferent cannon mounted on the walls. The garrison consists of about 2000 men, mostly *Canadians*; but there does not appear to be any scarcity of provisions among them."—(*From the Gentleman's Magazine*, 1760, vol. 30.)

Another document, furnished me by Mr. T. B. Akins, is taken from a London magazine of the day, and headed as follows:

"To supply in some measure the want of General Murray's Journal mentioned in the *Gazette*, which we were in hopes would have been communicated to the public, we shall present our readers with the following account of the proceedings at *Quebec*, which is the most minute that hath yet appeared.—(*English Magazine*, 1760.)

"Letter from an Officer of the 'Royal American Regiment.'

"QUEBEC, May 24th, 1760.

"SIR,—I believe a true account of our winter campaign will not be unacceptable to the military gentlemen. But before I enter upon what has

lately passed, it will be necessary to give an account of our army, and of the city and fortifications of Quebec, at the time our fleet left us last year, with a true state of the French army, the number of Canadians or savages they had then on foot ; and lastly, to point out the several advantages they had over us.

“ Ten battalions, two companies of the artillery, one company of the Rangers, all harassed by one of the most fatiguing and difficult campaigns, many of them afflicted with scurvy, in all 7,000 men, made up our army.

“ The city of Quebec, that was to be our winter quarters, and our sole dependence, was by no means secure against a *coup-de-main*. Six bastions, with their curtains, that formed a chain from the scarf of *Cap Diamant* to that of *St. Roc*, was then our whole defence ; no foot-bank to the curtains, no embrasures made, no covered way, nor any outworks ; and finally, the cannon on the flanks so bad that they were quite useless.

“ It would be impossible to describe the miserable state of the city. Near one-third of the houses were reduced to ashes ; and what remained were so shattered by the cannon during our besieging it, that very few were fit to be inhabited.

“ The French army consisted of five battalions of old troops, thirty companies of marines, two companies of light-horse, 1200 savages, and about 8,000 Canadians, being in all about 13,000 men, all in good health, and who had not undergone a tenth part of the fatigue our troops had been exposed to.

“ That army had undoubtedly many advantages over us : first, the men were healthy ; second, they were perfectly acquainted with the country ; third, they had fresh provisions in abundance, having under their dominion all the south coast from Quebec downwards ; lastly, none of our motions could escape them, by the uncommon situation of the town.

“ Such was the army we had to contend with. It may, perhaps, be thought we have been blockaded all winter, but this was not the case ; we staid within the walls no longer than was necessary to repair our houses and render them habitable, and to secure our ramparts against a *coup-de-main*.

“ The repairing near 500 houses, building eight redoubts of wood out of the city, making foot-banks along the ramparts, opening embrasures, placing our cannon, blocking-up all the avenues of the suburbs with a stockade, carrying eleven months' provisions into the highest part of the city, and forming a magazine of 4,000 fascines, were only the forerunners of the toils and fatigues that still were reserved for us.

“ The enemy's patrols all this time carried off our cattle, often under the cannon of the place, though not always with impunity. As soon as we had taken all the precautions human prudence could dictate for our own preservation, we took the field. Six hundred men marched out in two columns ; the one, of 200, went to *St. Foy* ; the other, of 400, to *Lorette*. We took post

at both places; and as soon as they were secured, a corps of 700 men marched to St. Augustin, brought off the enemy's advanced guard, with many cattle, and disarmed the inhabitants.

"These two posts were of the greatest importance. First, they gave us an opportunity of watching the enemy's motions, while they covered ours; second, they put under our dominion eleven parishes, which greatly contributed to furnish us with fresh provisions during the winter, and whatever was necessary for subsistence, and at the same time relieved the garrison in the works they were carrying on; lastly, by furnishing us with wood, an article of the utmost consequence, and which deserves a particular consideration. When the fleet left us, we had, at most, firing for fifteen or ten days. Winter came on with hasty strides; the forest of *St. Foix* was the nearest to the town; we wanted near 16,000 cords of wood for the hospitals, guards and quarters, and we had at that time but very little felled on the Island of Orleans; the transporting it was extremely slow and difficult, as the river was then covered with floating ice. Very few days after we had secured the posts of Lorette and St. Foix, we set 200 fellers at work, and made a sufficient number of hand-sledges. Towards the latter end of November, we began to distribute firing. The several regiments sent out all the men off duty with these sledges, and they brought as much wood to the garrison as they could drag. It is to be observed that this work was carried on during three months, at a season of the year which, for its severity, may be said to be unknown to European climates.

"Our affairs wearing then a good aspect, and finding ourselves secured against sudden attack, a detachment of 200 men was sent beyond the St. Lawrence; they disarmed the inhabitants, and made them take the oaths of allegiance. This step made us masters of all the south coast, and supplied us with great quantities of fresh provisions.

"Some time before the French army had taken up their winter quarters, their advanced posts were at *Pointe-aux-Trembles*, *St. Augustin*, and *Le Calvaire*; the remainder of their army was between *les Trois Rivières* and *Jacques Cartier*. The French generals being informed that our garrison diminished daily, by the constant and unavoidable hardships we were exposed to, resolved to carry the place by main force in the midst of winter. In pursuit of that scheme, they made all the necessary preparations; rackets or snow-shoes were distributed to the soldiery, and great numbers of scaling-ladders were made; they even exercised the men to fix and mount the scaling-ladders. The attack was to have been made towards the middle of February; and notwithstanding all their precautions to conceal their designs, by cutting off all communications with Jacques Cartier, which hitherto had been open to the Canadians, we were apprised of their intentions. The enemy, who had never lost sight of their project, sent a detachment to *Pointe Levis*, to take post there, to collect together the inhabitants of the southern shore, and strengthen their army therewith, and to form a magazine of provisions: the posts of Calvaire and St. Augustin were also reinforced by some companies of grenadiers.

" The enemy had been about eight days in possession of Point Levy, busied in heaping up a great quantity of flour, and killing 400 oxen for the subsistence of their army during the expedition, when our light infantry, with a detachment of 200 men, dislodged them (we could not attempt it sooner, the river not being frozen over). Their retreat being very precipitate, they lost but few men; one officer and eleven private men only were made prisoners; but we became masters of the greatest part of their provisions. We took post in the St. Joseph Church until we had built two wooden redoubts, and mounted cannon on one of them.

" A few days after, the enemy came with a greater force to recover the said post; but having timely notice of it, some battalions were ordered to march over the ice to cut them off; others, with the light infantry, to attack them while they were besieging the church. The enemy, finding themselves surrounded on all sides, thought of a retreat, which was so precipitate, that, notwithstanding our troops marched with all possible diligence, they overtook only part of the rear. After this retreat, we finished our redoubts, felled many trees, and secured our posts from the danger of any insult. The same detachment that had attempted to force us, went some days after and took post at St. Michel, below Point Levy. We did not think proper to molest them, considering the great distance they were from us.

" It seemed now probable the French had altered their views; that they would postpone any further attack to the spring, and then form a regular siege; at least, all their preparations seemed to indicate it. They began rigging their ships, repairing their barques and boats, building galleys, casting balls and bombs, and making a prodigious quantity of fascines and gabions; in short, prepared everything that was necessary for a siege. We, on the other hand, made a great number of fascines, pallsades, and stakes, to intrench ourselves on the heights of Abraham, as soon as the season would permit.

" While these preparations were making on both sides, part of our light infantry, with a detachment from the army, went and surprised the enemy's advanced posts at St. Augustin, Maison Brulée, and le Calvaire; and notwithstanding their alertness in retreating, we took ninety prisoners. Some time after, they hoped to take their revenge, by attempting to carry off our wood-cutters and rangers that covered Lorette and St. Foix; but they were repulsed.

" Our circumstances became daily more critical. There was a great probability the French army and ships would fall down the river as soon as it opened, and (the ground being yet frozen) that we would not have time to complete our intrenchments. These considerations induced us to send the light infantry to Cap Rouge, with orders to fortify that post, as well to prevent the enemy's landing there as to be nearer at hand to observe their motions. The works had hardly begun when the frost broke up; the enemy's ships fell down and landed their army at St. Augustin, and marched directly towards Lorette, in order to surprise that post, and cut off those of Cap Rouge and St.

Foix. We prevented their success: the detachment at Lorette fell back on St. Foix, and part of the garrison marched out and covered the retreat from these posts, with the loss of two men only.

“The night between the 27th and 28th April, the whole French army was at St. Foix, and their advanced posts within musket-shot of the town. On the 28th, in the morning, our light infantry and volunteers marched out, drove off the enemy’s van, and obliged them to keep at a great distance. At nine, our whole army marched out of the town, with twenty pieces of cannon, and all necessary tools and implements to intrench ourselves upon the heights of Abraham. We had just reached the ground, when we discovered the enemy’s van on the small eminences at the entrance of *Sillery Wood*, and their main army marching along the road of St. Foix. As fast as they advanced, they took shelter in the wood, and formed there. This was deemed the decisive moment to attack the enemy, in order to reap all the advantage to be expected over an army not yet formed. In consequence of this resolution, our men advanced: eight battalions made up our first line, and two the second line; the light infantry and two companies of grenadiers covered our right flank; our volunteers, the rangers, and a detachment of 100 men, covered the left. As soon as we came within musket-shot, our light-infantry attacked the enemy’s grenadiers on the left, and repulsed them briskly; at the same instant, the volunteers and rangers attacked their right (which also gave way), and made themselves masters of a redoubt the enemy had taken possession of; the centre advanced posts fled without a blow. Whilst we thus obliged the van to fly, the body of the enemy’s army advanced with great strides, and formed in columns; as soon as formed, one of the columns came to sustain the grenadiers, pursued by our light infantry; they directly wheeled round the rising grounds, and took our right wing in flank; at the same time, another column, headed by the Chevalier de Levis, wheeled round our flank; the battalions of the second line immediately made a movement to the right and left to cover and protect our flanks. This was the critical moment: we were in danger of having all the forces of Canada to cope with, and our communication was cut off. These considerations obliged us to retreat, finding ourselves not strong enough to resist, and not having been able to prevent their forming. We were compelled to leave our cannon behind us, the wreaths of snow and bad roads rendering it impossible to bring them off. We had 300 men killed or taken prisoners in the action, and seven hundred wounded. The French lost, according to their own confession, 2,500 men.

“The French army consisted of ten complete battalions (having been completed by picked men from the Canadians), 400 savages, and 7,600 Canadians; being, in all, 13,000 men. Our army, before the battle, was 3,111 men.

“The French order of battle was ten companies of grenadiers, two of volunteers, 400 savages, for the van; eight battalions drawn up in four columns, with some corps of *Canadians* in the intervals, for the main body; two battalions and some corps of *Canadians* on the flank, for the rear; and lastly, 2,000 *Canadians* for a reserve. Such was their order and intentions if we had given them time to form.

"The French opened their trenches in the night between the 28th and 29th; their ships anchored at *Foulon*, below their camp; for several days they were busy in landing their cannon, mortars, and other ammunition; they worked incessantly at perfecting their trenches and in raising batteries; and on the 11th May, they opened three batteries of cannon and one bomb-battery. We made the necessary dispositions to defend the place to the last extremity; we planted cannon on every bastion, and even in the curtains; we raised two cavaliers, and made outworks. The enemy cannonaded us briskly the first day; but our artillery (which had already obliged them to change their attack) soon silenced them, and their fire slackened daily. Before they opened their batteries, we had 132 pieces of cannon placed on our ramparts, mostly dragged there by the soldiery. Notwithstanding this formidable artillery, we were so circumstanced, that, had a French fleet appeared first in the river, the place must inevitably have fallen, though we had resolved to make, and undoubtedly would have made, the most vigorous and obstinate resistance.

"The 9th of May, one of our frigates anchored in the basin, and brought us the joyful news of our ships being in the river; the 15th, in the evening, a ship-of-the-line and a frigate anchored also opposite the town; and early on the 16th, our two frigates set sail, ran above the town, and attacked the French squadron, which immediately weighed anchor; but they were so closely followed, and so briskly attacked, that their whole fleet, consisting of six ships, ran aground in different places; their commodore was taken, and afterwards destroyed.

"This was like a thunderbolt to the French: they went off the same evening, and raised the siege with such precipitation, that they abandoned *thirty-four cannon*, six mortars, all their field equipage, their provisions, and, finally, an immense quantity of every implement necessary for the siege. Our light infantry and grenadiers pursued the enemy as far as *Cap Rouge*, and took many prisoners. The remainder of their army is now at *Jacques Cartier*; and what their further intentions are, cannot at present be known to us.

"By recapitulating all that has been mentioned, and adding that 1,000 men have died during the winter, and nearly 2,000 have been alternately in the hospital, it will appear that 4,000, or thereabouts, have accomplished all the work, and sustained incredible fatigues for eight months together, and at a season designed in other countries for the relief and refreshment of troops. Let it be further observed, that it was impossible to receive any pay during the whole winter; yet, nobody ever grumbled (a circumstance very extraordinary among common soldiers.) Thus have we equalled, if not surpassed, our fore-fathers in many things."

In reference to the battle of St. Foy, Garneau says:—"The numbers of the two contending armies were nearly co-equal, for De Levis left several detachments to protect his artillery,

barges, and the bridge at *Jacques Cartier*, in order to assure himself a way of retreat, in case he were worsted. The cavalry took no part in the action."

As to the British:—" Their loss was considerable, nearly a fourth of their soldiers being killed or wounded. The French experienced great loss, having been obliged to form rank and remain long immoveable under the enemy's fire. A brigadier, six colonels (*chefs de bataillon*), and ninety-seven other officers, with a savage chief, were killed or wounded. After the action, which lasted *three hours*, the French took post at the *Buttes à Neveau*, and established their camp on the same plains where they had just so gloriously avenged their defeat thereupon in the preceding year." He also tells us:—" Within a comparative small space, 2,500 had been struck by bullets; the patches of snow and icy puddles on the ground were reddened with the bloodshed that the frozen ground refused to absorb;" and " the transport of the wounded to the General Hospital (almost close at hand) occupied twenty-four hours;" and he cites a *religieuse*, to the effect, that " the cries of the wounded and the groans of the dying, with the lamentations of friends, were heart-rending. After having dressed more than 500 patients, placed on beds obtained from the King's magazines, there still remained others unprovided for. Our granges and cattle-sheds were full of them. We had in our infirmaries 72 officers, of whom 33 died," &c., &c.

Lieutenant Fraser writes:—" We had very little chance of beating an army four-times our number." To this Mr. LeMoine has attached the following note:—" The other accounts make the French army anything but '*four-times the number*' of the English army. It appears certain, however, that Levis had the advantage of numbers, and Murray of position, and a splendid park of artillery, some twenty odd pieces, on a rising ground; while Levis had but two guns, and his troops were fatigued by their laborious trudge through

the *Bijou marsh* and *Suède road*, at a time of the year (28th April) when the winter snow and rain had made the roads nearly impassable."

We believe there is good ground for accepting Murray's statement, that he only marched out 3,000 men from the enfeebled garrison, and that he lost 1,000 in the battle, for we know that when he subsequently advanced on Montreal, and when it was desirable that he should do so with as large a force as possible, he could only muster 2,500 men, after providing for garrisoning Quebec. De Levis's *whole* force was undoubtedly very much larger than Murray's; but we know that he did leave a portion, as Garneau writes. We know, also, that Murray brought on the action before Levis's available force was all up; but it is beyond dispute that the force actually engaged largely outnumbered the British; and Murray spoke nothing but the truth when he wrote that he was "*fairly fought down* and reduced to a handful," and that he was "obliged to yield to superiority of numbers and a fresh column of Roussillon."

Mr. LeMoine is quite correct in his statement that Murray had the advantage of position, and an enormous superiority in artillery; and many believe, had he not given up these advantages, the result might have been different. Many in the British army entertained the opinion to which Lieutenant Fraser gave expression, that, "his passion for glory getting the better of his reason, he ordered the army to march out and attack the enemy." "He is," says Fraser, "in many respects possessed of several virtues, and particularly military ones, *except prudence*, and entirely free of mercenary motives; but as his conduct on this occasion is universally condemned by all those who are not immediately dependent on him, truth obliges me to state matters as I believe they really stood, more especially as it is not said he advised with any who had a right to be consulted before such a step."

Lord Mahon, writing nearly a century later, when it might be supposed he could write dispassionately, says:—"Our

troops, amounting to about 6,000 men, and commanded by Brigadier-General Murray, had been left to maintain our new conquest of Quebec, at the time the fleet sailed for England. But as the fortifications of the town itself were not considerable on the land side, and as all communication with England was cut off by the ice in the lower St. Lawrence, the French deemed the opportunity auspicious, and resolved to attempt to recover their lost ground. Their Governor, the Marquis de Vaudreuil, could still send forth, from his head-quarters at Montreal, 5,000 regular soldiers, and at least as many Canadian militia. These he intrusted to the charge of the Chevalier de Levis, an officer of reputation, with orders to advance on Quebec as soon as the approach of spring might enable them to form a regular siege. The disposable force of Murray was, on the other hand, much reduced by sickness and by the necessity of leaving the ramparts protected; so that he could lead from the gates little more than 3,000 men. With such inferiority of numbers, it seemed contrary to the dictates of common sense to choose to try the fortune of war in the open field, instead of reserving the troops—which, though weak, as an army, was strong as a garrison,—for the defence of a fortified post. But the English general was flushed with victory, and emulous of the fame of Wolfe. On the 28th April, he marched out of town, and found the enemy but a few miles distant, at Sillery. The English commenced the attack with great impetuosity, and obtained at first some advantage; but the superiority of numbers soon turned the scale against them; they were worsted and driven back into Quebec, with nearly 1,000 killed or wounded. It was their boast, however, that the loss of the enemy in this action had been at least double their own.”

We have now seen how widely conflicting are the accounts of the battle of St. Foy. We cannot think that justice has been done to either of the parties engaged. We believe that, *as a battle*, it was more severe, and its results nearly as

important as the battle of the previous year ; but the death of the two distinguished and chivalrous commanders attached so much romance to that battle, that the world has been carried away from the consideration of the other important features which it presents. But we can now look at both dispassionately, and we are at once struck with the fact that the battle of the 13th September was decided in eight, or, at most, fifteen minutes, with a loss to the victors of only 57 killed and 600 wounded, and to the vanquished, of 500 killed and 500 wounded.

The battle of the 28th April was the most severely-contested action of the whole war : it lasted, according to Murray, *one hour and three-quarters*, (according to Garneau, *three hours*,) with a loss to him of a third of his whole force, and to Levis of 2,500 men.

After having given the matter our best consideration, and divesting ourselves of prejudice, as far as we can, we may safely say that, of the victory of St. Foy the French might well be proud, and the British have no reason to be ashamed. The monument of St. Foy is only a just tribute which their common descendants have paid to the brave men who fought and fell there, and to their heroic commanders, Levis and Murray ; but it has yet to be crowned ; so let us hope, as Mr. LeMoine has quoted from the Montreal "Telegraph," "that before another century dawns, the fusion will be complete, and as Briton, Roman, Saxon, Dane, and Norman blended to form the English people, so all the races that find in Canada a home may, by forbearance, mutual respect, strict justice, and an enlarged view of their nationality, bury in a common grave the dead bones of their militant prejudices, whether of faith or origin, and look smiling down on them as a united Canadian nation, not ignoring but drawing wisdom from past struggles and contentions, making past war the mother of present and future peace."

APPENDIX.

I.—THE DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND ENGLISH WRITERS.

In his work, "*De Montcalm in Canada*," par un ancien missionnaire, published in Tournai in 1867, at page 193, Père Martin gives the following note on the discrepancies between the various writers whom he had consulted :

"It is difficult, at the present day, to decide with certainty as to the numbers of the two armies which met on the plains of Abraham ; ancient writers are no more in accord than modern. Here are the estimates :

	" French.	English.
" L'Intendant Bigot.....	3,500	3 to 4,000
" Montreuil, Major-General.....	?	4,500
" Doreil, Commissaire.....	3,000	6,000
" Colonel Fraser	5,000	4,000

"(Sullivan says the forces were equal, but that Wolfe's soldiers were disciplined veterans, and that the half of Montcalm's were militia and Indians.)

	" French.	English.
" Hawkins.....	5,000	4,800
" Bancroft.....	5,000	5,000
" Garneau.....	4,500	8,000
" Beatson.....	7,500	4,828
" Dussieux	4,500	5,000

"The estimate given by Garneau, of the English, and by Colonel Beatson, of the French, are evidently exaggerated."

II.—NUMBERS OF THE RESPECTIVE FORCES OF WOLFE AND MONTCALM AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN.

The late Mr. Thompson, who was for 69 years superintendent of military works at Quebec, and who was a participator in all the events connected with the conquest, as a volunteer in *Fraser's Highlanders*, wrote a journal, yet unpublished, but from which I make the following extracts :

"LOUISBOURG, May 31st, 1759.—Brigadier Moncton arrived with four battalions from Halifax and two battalions from the Bay of Fundy. Our whole force was now assembled, consisting of ten battalions, three companies

of grenadiers from the garrison of Louisbourg, a detachment of artillery, and five companies of rangers, the whole amounting to eight thousand five hundred and thirty-five men fit for duty, officers included.

"*French Force.*—The Quebec brigade, commanded by Colonel de St. Ours, on the right, 3,500 men; the brigade of Three Rivers, commanded by M. de Berme, on the right, 900 men; the centre, to be composed of regular troops, commanded by Senezargues, 2,000 men; the Montreal militia, on the left, commanded by M. Prudhomme, 1,100; the brigade of the Island of Montreal, commanded by M. Herbin, 2,300; the cavalry, chiefly regulars, 350; light troops, chiefly Canadians and Acadians, 1,400; Indians, exclusive of the scouting and scalping parties, 450; total, 12,000. This force was ranged in order of battle from the bridge of the river St. Charles to the falls of Montmorency, to oppose the landing of the British in that quarter. The garrison of Quebec was defended by the militia and a few regulars, under de Ramezay.

"Our loss of men, during the whole campaign, stood as follows:—18 officers and 252 men killed; total killed, 270. 107 officers and 1,116 men wounded; total, 1,223. Total killed and wounded, 1,493."

Garneau, in his account of the "Battle of Beauport Flats," says the British loss was, on that occasion alone, 500 killed and wounded.

III.—THE BATTLE OF ST. FOY.

I believe that, with the exception of M. Garneau, all writers admit that Levis's force exceeded that of Murray. Garneau states that the English had 7,714 men, exclusive of officers, and that the French were *co-equal*. It has been pointed out that L'Abbé Ferland, who wrote subsequent to Garneau, and gives Levis as his authority, quoting his despatch still in existence, says, Murray had 4,000 men and Levis not more than 4,500 actually engaged.

I have translated from the statement attached to Vandreuil's letter of 3rd May, 1760, still of record in the archives at Paris, and a copy of which was procured for the Literary and Historical Society, the following passage in reference to the numbers with which Vandreuil says Levis left Montreal:

"On 20th April the troops left their quarters (at Montreal). They consisted of eight battalions of troops of the line, and two battalions of Colonial troops, forming together 5 brigades, and about 3 000 Canadians, all of the city of Montreal and its neighbourhood. The first formed a battalion destined as a reserve, and the other was attached to the brigade of regular troops."

IV.—REGIMENTS UNDER WOLFE.

It will be useful to compare with the statement already given from Thompson's unpublished Journal, that given by Lieut. Fraser, in his Journal, published by the *Literary and Historical Society* :

<i>“ Regiments.</i>	<i>Men.</i>
“ 15th, Amherst's.....	500
“ 28th, Bragg's.....	550
“ 35th, Otway's.....	800
“ 43rd, Kennedy's.....	650
“ 47th, Lascelles'.....	500
“ 48th, Webb's.....	800
“ 58th, Anstruther's.....	500
“ 60th, 2nd and 3rd battalions.....	1,000
“ 63rd, Fraser's.....	1,100
“ Grenadiers of 22nd, 40th, and 45th, from Louisbourg.....	300
“ Artillery.....	300
“ Rangers.....	400
“ Light Infantry.....	200
“ Marines.....	1,000
“ In gross, supposed, at most.....	8,600.”

This force sailed from Louisbourg on the 4th of June, 1759. The following extract is from his Journal of the 24th of April, 1760:

State of the Garrison of Quebec, April 24th, 1760.

Colonels' Names.	Regiments.	Fit for duty.	Sick.	Total.	Dead since Sept. 18th, 1759.
Amherst's.....	15th.	323	109	432	26
Bragg's.....	28th.	304	200	504	29
Otway's.....	35th.	255	285	640	96
Kennedy's.....	43rd.	272	194	466	130
Lascelles'.....	47th.	305	170	475	64
Webb's.....	48th.	483	214	697	85
Anstruther's.....	58th.	324	158	482	10
Monkton's (2nd battalion).....	60th.	{ 237	163	400	61
Laurence's (3rd battalion).....		{ 253	215	468	58
Fraser's.....	63rd.	314	580	894	106
Royal Artillery.....	171	24	194	17
Totals.....	3341	2312	5653	682

It may be taken for granted that Fraser's statement did not include the men at the two outposts of St. Foy and Lorette, which originally consisted of 600 men, but which by this time had been reduced by various casualties. Murray's whole force, then, on the 24th April, could have exceeded but little 6,000, of whom 2,312 were sick, and only 3,341 fit for duty. It is desirable to note, particularly in connexion with a statement about to be given from Garneau, that the 63rd regt. (78th Fraser's Highlanders), which Mr. Thompson says were raised in Tain, Ross-shire, to the number of upwards of 1,400 men, when they reached Louisbourg from New York, where they had passed the winter, mustered only 1,200, and were on the 24th April reduced to 894, having lost by death, since 18th September, no less than 106, and having 580 sick in hospital.

Knox, at page 181, vol. 2nd, of his Journal, gives a return shewing the strength of the garrison on 29th October to be 7,313, and the rank and file of the 78th regiment 978. He also informs us, at page 267, that on the 1st March, "We are reduced to 4,800 fighting men." At page 340, we have a return shewing that on the 15th June, 1760, the garrison consisted of 313 officers and non-commissioned officers, and 5,209 rank and file,—total, 5,522, of whom 2,299 were sick and wounded. At page 344, we learn that the troops under orders for embarkation, and who did embark on 13th July, for service up the St. Lawrence to Montreal, numbered 2,451 men.

V.—GENERAL MURRAY'S ORDER.

Note by Garneau, vol. 3, page 248:—"Suivant les ordonnances de paiement pour leur solde expirée le 24 Avril, ou 4 jours avant la 2de bataille d'Abraham, ordonnance dont voici une copie textuelle pour le 78 Régiment (Montagnards Ecossois.)

"By the Honorable JAMES MURRAY, Esq., Governor of Quebec, &c.:

"You are hereby required and directed, out of such monies as shall come into your hands for the subsistence of His Majesty's forces under my command, to pay or cause to be paid to Lieutenant James Henderson, Deputy-Paymaster

of His Majesty's 78th Regiment of Foot, or his assigns, the sum of two thousand one hundred and sixty-three pounds, nineteen and six-pence, sterling, being for subsistence of said regiment between the 24th day of February and the 24th day of April, both days inclusive, as per account annexed; and for so doing this, with the acquittance of the said Lientenant James Henderson, or his assigns, shall be to you a sufficient warrant and discharge. Given under my hand, at Quebec, this 27th day of November, 1760.

" (Signed,) JAS. MURRAY.

" (Countersigned,) H. T. CRAMAHE.

" To ROBERT PORTER, Esq., Deputy-Postmaster-General.

56 Sergeants, @ 1s. per diem.....	£ 2 16 0
56 Corporals, @ 8d. "	1 17 0
28 Drummers, @ 8d. "	0 18 0
1,195 Privates, @ 6d. "	29 17 6
	£35 9 6
" Total for 60 days.....	£2,163 19 6

" Signed,) JAMES HENDERSON,

" Lieut. and Depy.-Paymaster, 78th Regt."

We have no doubt that Garneau cites this order (and believed that he was correct in citing it) to prove *that there were at Quebec*, between the 24th day of February and 24th April, 1335 officers and men of the 78th regiment, instead of 894, given by Fraser and others; but it proves, as I have been informed by a gentleman conversant with such matters, *nothing more* than that that was the strength of the regiment during that period, whether at Quebec *or elsewhere*, and was merely the usual order in favor of the paymaster, through whom the men are paid, whether with the main body of the regiment, at the depot, or on detached service. It will be observed that the order bears date 27th November, six months after it was due.

Mr. LeMoine, in referring to the different authorities, says:—"We have also Smith's account, not over-correct; and Garneau's narrative, probably the most complete, and collated from documents, many of which had never seen the light

